Ordering,
democracy and utopia
In
section III-a the practice of the personal was
discussed in the sense of meaning and ritual.
The idea was that wishing respect for oneself
the other also needs to be respected - nothing
but a fair deal. The religion of regularly
associating for the sake of a holy person then,
who, including a holy scripture, really is
worthy the full respect, constitutes a school of
learning. In history are the schools there in
succession. From the consecution of the schools
one can derive in what way they each for
themselves fell short and in what respect the
science of the person was in need of an upgrade,
of an adaptation to the time and circumstance.
To this upgrading there is never an end, one
unrelenting has to keep to the time; the
dynamical nature reflected in the culture
commands a constant reorienting and readapting,
which, as we saw with the method, only
non-repressively progressing truly entails the
progress. Baruch
Spinoza
(1632-1677) in his Theological-political
Treatise said that God's providence is to be
understood as the order itself of nature and
also Vyâsa described it in the
Bhâgavatam
likewise calling nature the virâth
rûpa or the gigantic form of God. To
the need of the constant adaptation to that
personally understood God, is the dynamical
element of the time of the living nature as
being the universal object of worship
recognized. The idea of God as being a dynamical
natural reality at the disposition of a personal
choice is also, in the sense of an alternative
paradigm, mentioned by modern physicists like
David
Bohm (1917-1992)
in Wholeness and the Implicate Order and
Fritjof
Capra
(1939), in e.g. his book The
Turning
Point
(1982). So even though we might be erring with
the constancy of lightspeed, offers the new
physics a helping hand, especially those
contributions that do not deny the possibility
of the existence of a connecting element like
the ether.
And this is politically of importance because
the ideation of natural science happens to form
the basis for the rest of the sciences, just
like the story of creation constitutes the basis
for the Bible and the Purâna. The idea of
how the world originated and functions is
indicative for the rest of the cultural
superstructure. Reasoning from quantum-mechanics
and pushing himself off against a mechanical,
fixed, singly cartesian dimensionality outside
of the dimension of the time-space of the new
physics, arrives Capra almost like the new-age
guru Osho most poetically at sayings like:
'There is motion but there are, ultimately, no
moving objects; there is activity but there are
no actors; there are no dancers, there is only
the dance.' Also new-age authors like
Marilyn
Ferguson
at length dilate on the consequences of the
dynamical, indeterminacy of the true energetic
self of the universe in which we to her opinion,
with that premise being of selfrealization, are
all connected in what she (in 1982) calls the
'aquarian conspiracy'. Concerning the resistance
against it she states: 'It's not so much that
we're afraid of change or so in love with the
old ways, but it's that place in between that we
fear . . . . It's like being between trapezes.
It's Linus when his blanket is in the dryer.
There's nothing to hold on to.' The old
shoes are worn, but the new ones aren't yet
comfortable, but it's another type of
consciousness, another way of seeing which we
materially political, technical and legal, or
else individually therapeutic have to give shape
from the principle in order to make the change
with the order of time possible. Ferguson is
right in her option of connectedness in this, of
the basically operating from the inside, with a
'trojan heart' taking up the karma, as she put
it in an
interview in
1995;
the same old science time and again has to be
reformulated and adapted in faith with the
dynamical and personal nature, the way we also
time and again have a new constellation of the
same old planets. Without that revaluing,
without that adaptation to place, culture,
person and time is one fixed and has one fallen
thereof lost one's way or is one bewildered in
attachment, as Vyâsa puts it (S.B.
4.8:
54).
It is, varying to the classical themes of
wisdom, always an unfinished structure.
Historically we so first had the vedic culture
itself that, in her rule defeated by the time,
came to a fall on the basis of the familial
attachments of the aristocracy, which, having
become a burden to mother earth, had to wipe
itself off the planet at the battlefield of the
great war of the Mahâbhârata.
Greek philosophy just like that came with the
philosopher Socrates being condemned to drink
the cup of poison, to a fall with the
deliverance of the proof undermining the
authority of the state of the lesser wisdom of
the pretentious formalism of the ruling class;
with the moral drawn stated in the
Gîtâ (in 3:
39):
'with ones wisdom one mustn't upset the
people'. Buddhism came, with the
foodpoisoning to the death of the Buddha, to a
fall in the human tolerance for impurities and
the negation of the world as being an illusion;
like an Arjuna blowing the conchshell, one has
to hold one's ground. Judaism came to a fall by
it's impersonal, institutional denial of the
living personal God, the nevertheless as
inevitable recognized Messiah or
avatâra. Christianity falls down
from a poor concept of time with an
insufficiently expressed Lord Jesus who in this
couldn't be more specific than stating that it,
with the then (45 v. Chr., 709 A.U.C) abolishing
of the lunar calendar since Julius Caesar, on
earth indeed had to happen as in heaven; for the
Lord, the Father happens to be
kâla, the Time. Islam which with the
order of time for God and His ether with the
times of prayer did obey the sun - recognized as
the will of God, Allah - following, comes to a
fall by her fundamentalistic, jihadistic lust
for lording over, and being of disrespect for,
other forms of belief; for he who always wants
to win will, by the golden rule, have to loose
it sooner or later as a consequence. There
irrevocably happen to be different
avatâras and ditto devotional
cultures that each have their historical purpose
and
maintenance. Reformation must, to the
self-willed of the compassion and the
integration of the social science, with the
christian fall-down in theological opposition
and one-sidedness, next expand into a more
multicultural, rationalistic-empirical
enlightenment of expanding the consciousness,
for the reformer S'rî
Caitanya
(1486-1543) happened to conclude to an
inscrutable oneness in diversity. The culture of
Enlightenment
comes, entirely predictable from natural
entropy*,
because of a lack of consistency and
philosophical unequivocalness next to a fall
with the French Revolution finding fault with
all that elitary and false
subjectivistic/empirical individualism; for as
we knew already: the
philosopher must
sing.
Democracy finally in a social/revolutionary
sense defended with the French Revolution,
comes, liberal/conservative finding itself in
opposition, to a fall in the degrading in the
dictatorships of communism, militaristic fascism
and fundamentalism, for the cards of the human
identity have been shuffled - as is also
vedically confirmed. Therewith are we at the
onset of the twenty-first century awaiting the
definitive falldown of the so divinely lusty,
but especially internationally most unjust,
capitalist dictate with it's sanctification of
commercial strife, with which then the limit
will have been reached of the possible forms of
corruption in the human
fields of
action
of the nepotistic, viz. on friends and family
founded, democracy that constantly runs into
dictatorships, as was discussed in section Ib.
The hindu goddess of money, S'rî
Lakshmî, in the end is but a maid-servant
of Lord Vishnu, the Lord of goodness and
maintenance. The politics of friends, the faulty
combination of riches and connectedness, and the
democracy do not combine that well, so was shown
already by the philosopher Thomas
Hobbes
(1588-1679) in his Leviathan. He only
knew three forms of state: the monarchy, the
democracy and the aristocracy, viz. the people
represented by one man, by an assembly of all
the ones willing thereto and the representation
of a part of that gathering. Nepotism makes
democracy an aristocracy in disguise, an
aristocracy which Hobbes in case of dissension -
not so surprising with chosen 'nobles' aiming at
a more lucrative position in industrial circles
- with the populace calls an oligarchy, a
culture of regents far removed from the people
and for the countering of which one in The
Netherlands e.g. notably introduced the
monarchy. A monarchy which, with many an
illusory smoke curtain of fake-democratic
left-right changes, proves itself to be a
culture of regents for which the populace has no
feeling but only dissent, is according Hobbes'
logic then factually a tiranny. In our case thus
a capitalist dictatorship: the confluence of a
faulty combination of capital and philosophy at
the one hand with a wrong notion of political
power at the other hand. It is only the
complacency of the consensus of the anxious,
capital-motivated majority, repressing
and violating minorities, that thinks less of
the volunteer in the service of God calling him
unemployed declaring him subservient to the
Mammon, and that being of an unjust treatment
neglects the rest of the world, which makes one
think that one is a democrat. False and ignorant
contentment with factual injustice makes no
stable state. And thus one could say that the
idea of the majority of the voters, yet bears no
justice, and carries a false idea of democracy.
The republican democracy, or else the monarchy,
is only real when in case of justice, when
everyone is done justice and not just a 60% or
80% majority. Thus we are faced with the need of
a general consensus about the installation of
election-groups (see also synopsis)
in a beforehand settled order not allowing
mutual repression with a majority-vote: the
majority must on a basis of consensus about this
self-knowledge paradoxically manage to protect
itself against itself. Rousseau (see also
Charter
of Order)
said about this in 'The societal contract' II.3:
'In order to really obtain the general will, it
is thus of importance that there is no group
split off in the state and that each citizen
only is opinionated from his own stance. Such
was the case with the eminent order of state of
the great Lycurgus. And if there would be any
groups spit off, must one increase their number
and see to it that they are equally large as did
Solon, Numa and Servius. These measures of
precaution are the only right ones to further
that the general will (as opposed to the
specific will) for sure shall clearly and
constantly surface and the people will not be
mislead.' The power is, divided in a
proportionate representation of, classically
tailored, fixed election groups, thus to no
one but to God (see further
'A
Small Philosophy of
Association').
It
is the 'easygoing' fake-democracy of nepotism
which, because of a lack of a societal structure
of fixed election groups representative for all
the vocational and professional groups that thus
balance each other at the level of the
government, is wasting her qualities, and that
way in fact thus discourages those qualities -
and therefrom one sees the decline of the
political character. It is thus paramount to
educate
anew the democracy, or as Alexis
de Tocqueville
(1805-1859) it right away in the preface to his
study on the democracy
in America
stated: 'The first duty which is at this time
imposed upon those who direct our affairs is to
educate the democracy; to warm its faith, if
that be possible; to purify its morals; to
direct its energies; to substitute a knowledge
of business for its inexperience, and an
acquaintance with its true interests for its
blind propensities; to adapt its government to
time and place, and to modify it in
compliance with the occurrences and the actors
of the age. A new science of politics is
indispensable to a new world. ' In this context
we stress the notion of time and place, since in
this is found the essence of our plea for the
ether and the order of time associated with it.
This re-education is, according Plato's
'The
Republic'
and his 'Seventh
Letter',
the responsibility of the philosopher who then
in fact is the boss, the philosopher-king, or
either of the king or ruler who then has to be
the philosopher. In the culture of vaishnavism
around the works of Vyâsa one therefore
speaks of the spiritual master or the
âcârya who is the
Mahârâja or the 'great king', even
though he stands more for the liberation in
devotional service than for the enlightenment of
a sovereign power of selfrealization which is
more reserved for the independent esoteric guru.
In the culture of Christianity which as yet was
not as conscious of the different types of
teachers as is explained section
III-a of the
synopsis,
this would account for the difference between
the theologian preaching liberation in being of
service in the religious community and the
psychologist/psychotherapist who wants to
educate the people in the enlightenment of a
philosophically responsible way of
selfrealization less stressing outside
authorities. With the guidance poised in between
these two fires of progress, is it clear that
without the philosophically founded reform or
re-education of the democracy, without the
constant upgrading of what is supposed to be the
democratic order, and without the filognosy
thereto of the - by mediation of the gnosis
around the order of time thus -; mutually as
being dependent declaring of the enlightenment
of science and the liberation in service of the
person of God, we inevitably will fall back
again into the darkness of the dictatorship and
the moralism which constitute the shadow-side of
a freedom ignorantly understood. The competition
between teachers of initiation and teachers of
instruction along the dimensions of the
impersonal, local and person-minded must with
the filognosy and the respect therewith for the
enlightenment of the teachers from within, come
to a stop. In terms of our filognosy must each
know his place. It is like the japanese
confucianist philosopher Ogyu
Sorai
(1666-1628) said it in his Rules of Study-6:
'A noble man therefore is 'not prejudiced'
in matters of right and wrong, good and bad. Bad
is when something is not fed and does not find
its deserved place. Good is to feed and let
something realize its full potential, and see to
it that it finds its place'. This last section
III-b is directed at shaping to the grace of our
filognosy this desired revaluation of democracy.
In
postmodern time now with the synergy exhausted,
depressed under the regime of artificiality and
fragmentation, we know the faith as such only
as, the way the philosopher Jean-François
Lyotard
(1924-1998) put it, a negative, cynical
realization of lost modernistic ideals, in which
society fell apart, like it was meat in the
showcase of the butcher, and the hope has been
forsaken for an all-embracing solution. One
could describe the postmodern situation as the
lamentation of the grand but, about the human,
religious and moral freedom, somewhat too
negativistic, power minded, philosopher
F.
Nietzsche
(1844-1900): it concerns an intellectual
depression which, literally in his case, with a
brain feverish of venereal disease seeing a
whipped horse in the street in tears falls
around it's neck. Postmodern man knows on the
basis of the philosophers, who as mere thinkers
aren't acceptable anymore today, and with the
social activists among them, like
Vladimir
Lenin
(1870-1924) and the early, equally
anti-religious 
Karl
Marx
(1818-1883), but one belief and one mantra:
'that's nonsense!'. The religion is, in a
depression being disappointed about the enduring
abuse by the human being, nothing but
hypocritical nonsense. But was it not the
ancient philosopher Epicurus
who (341-270 b. Chr.) in his letter to
Menoeceus' already said that 'Not the
man who denies the gods that are worshiped by
the masses, but the one who ascribes to the gods
what the mass believes about them, is
godless'. Marx is not entirely without a
form of belief or a God. He also builds on a
connecting element: 'There is, in every social
formation, a branch of production which
determines the position and importance of all
others; and the relations obtaining in this
branch accordingly determine the relations of
all other branches, as well. It is as though
light of a particular hue were cast upon
everything, tinging all other colors and
modifying their special features; or as if a
special ether determined the specific gravity of
everything found in it.' This he writes
in his 'Introduction
to a contribution to a critique of political
economy'.
But with probably deeming himself, and the
adherents of his historic-materialistic theory,
to be the impersonation of that ether, is with
the atheistic cry of nonsense which classically
to Epicurus factually was pronounced over the
(dis-)believer and not so much over God and His
gods, nevertheless at the onset of the
twenty-first century shamelessly worldwide the
materialistic doctrine of the, now also
socialistically practiced, sex- and money belief
practiced, with the worship of the idols called
Mammon and Viagra. In that disbelief is then
further everyone written off who dares to voice
a not-to-realize ideal contrary to the
misanthropic, but factually perverse,
relativistic/cynical paradigm.
The postmodern
philosopher Jacques
Derrida
(1930-2004) spoke of deconstruction when it's
about the appreciation of
interpretation-sensitive human forms of
existence or 'texts' as he calls it: each may
see in them whatever he likes and so it would be
impossible to arrive at a complete and coherent
concept and ditto society. He is right saying
that books alone don't suffice and also mutually
exercising respect texts never deliver one an
all-embracing or coherent image of reality. And
it is also sure that in a depression without
having a clear picture in one's mind there
indeed may be spoken of a literal deconstruction
of the image of time of the observer. Man
depressed is disturbed to the triple nature of
time: the past is black, the future is invisible
and the present is unpleasant. As a cultural
institute he breeds a no-future generation of
people suffering under what psychologists like
Martin
Seligman
call 'learned helplessness', a mental affliction
of the self-doubting kind in which no solace is
found of an absolute reference we could address
with the name of God and by which we could pull
ourselves out of our pool of misery. We saw that
also relativism,
as a faulty combination of scientific power and
philosopical knowledge, traditionally decried by
the Pope and exposed as a compensation, came to
a fall with the refutation of Einstein building
on a non-existent limit of light speed, who
appeared to be the God and Prophet of it, but
according the different empirical results of
scientific experiments about the speed of light
at the onset of this century, turned out not to
be irrefutable in it.
Even
though it's indeed difficult to prove materially
because of the paradigmatically being bound,
must be said that the ether simply exists once
we know why we in that context have to speak of
the forcefield of the Milky Way existing as a
fixed frame of reference. The time didn't turn
out to be absolute in the velocity of changing
with the light, but time was absolute in the
quality of the changing itself. As
Herakleitos
(535-447 B.C.) said: everything is in flux,
panta rhei. And thus is the relativistic
depression, that after Nietzsche was rampant in
the political era to the inability to supersede
Marx' atheistic, social idealism, unmasked as a
form of attachment in defiance of that change,
contrary to the absolute authority of our
dynamical Father of Time and His sacred ether,
the factual godhead of the classics by Nietzsche
declared to be as dead as the mean, mechanical
time, of the, from this view seen, hopelessly
outdated clock. Even a schoolboy is these days
capable of lecturing the physicists of the
fallen and all to linear conceived standard
time-paradigm. So succeeded the talented young
man Peter
Lynds
(born 1975) in 2003 therein, by, even before
Consoli's interpretation of Düsseldorf
already, stating that there are no separate
moments of time, and that only a continuous
change exists which one could consider absolute.
Furthermore turned the cynicism, the canine
variety of the biting sarcasm, never out to be a
successful rule of state, apart from the
isolationism and the paranoia of autarkies like
Hitler's
Germany and the Cambodja of Pol
Pot,
but rather constitutes a mental aberration of
possibly sociopathically abreacting, like a
cactus as thorny, depressed people mainly of
interest for practicing psychologists and
psychiatrists. 
Being
intellectually perverted in the negativism of a
mutually confirmed cultural pessimism, does one
like a cult leader e.g., love to keep up and
also be dutiful with the appearance of
authority, progress and civilization, but one
went, disturbed being postmodern, in fact
personally, intellectually and socially
bankrupt, uncertain about one's identity
therewith philosophically being lost, like we
noted with the
declaration of
order
already; that is the conclusion we from now have
to work with in this last part of the filognosy
of our comprehension. It is, nearing the end of
our argument, perfectly clear by now that
without a sober methodical approach, a proper
knowledge of facts, an effective and art-loving
analysis, a fine, disciplined sense, for
spiritual unification to the principle and a
well organized respect for the classical, meekly
and brotherly coexisting and each other
succeeding spiritual schools of learning, there
can be no mention of a meaningful political
approach of respect for, and from, the civilized
person in all his historical, social and
scientific glory. It is evident that with but a
color-sensitive ego-desire, with but an
economic/judicial argument, with but a
conservative attitude of private considerations
of decency and virtue, and but a single
socialistic ideal of sharing honestly in a
humanistic understanding for the weaknesses, we
will not be able to cope politically. None of
the dictatorships derived from a narrowed
politicized consciousness will last because of
the inequity they represent with their one-sided
dictates. The Tocqueville says thereto: 'The
consequence of this has been that the democratic
revolution has been effected only in the
material parts of society, without that
concomitant change in laws, ideas, customs, and
manners which was necessary to render such a
revolution beneficial.' If the democracy
really wants to be a blessing, will we have to
acknowledge that for the sake of her quality a
certain change of mind, a change in the
consciousness of the people, is required. Thus
we so arrived at the filognosy which, understood
from the causality of the person or the factual
substance of our investigation, more or less as
a precondition demands the scientific sobriety
and spirituality to the principle, or else
presents them as the indispensable elements
needed to enjoy the fruit of a beneficial
political disposition of emancipated people
taking responsibility.
With
the religion as the study we never graduate
from, and the politics as the right-minded
practice to it which time and again has to
recapitulate and adapt, confer and revise, have
we arrived at the necessity of a reliable,
thorough vision for the future. Without a
clearly outlined ideal, without a purpose in
mind, is as said, postmodern mankind not capable
of emerging from it's narcomaniac,
anxiety-neurotic, obsessive depression and
cynicism as being cured and thus capable of
finding a rational/democratic equilibrium
between the charitable enlightened humanistic,
and the materially motivated, traditional
moralistic/pragmatic 
argument.
What should we do when we, whether depressed
with Nietzsche or not, have to accept our
responsibility not able any longer to play hide
and seek behind the back of the traditional
authorities of in fact the parson and the
reverend? Who is able to tell us, grown-ups of
intellectual independence, what we would have
learned and would have to engage in next?
Science so divided in itself? That is, despite
of the behavioral side of science and the
theology, not personal enough. With the answer
found in the commentaries of the oppositional,
dialectical and democratic politics, and
therewith theologically following in the
footsteps of Desiderius
Erasmus
(1466 or 1469-1536) who stated that: 'It is
wrong like children to hold on to the letter and
not mature to the freedom of the spirit',
we see the greek word of polis emerging
as the etymological root of the concept of
politics, meaning a city or community determined
by a certain exercise of authority or form of
administration. It is evident that we, from the
scientific via the spiritual and the religiosity
of personal confessions and conversions, having
arrived at the political, the 'talent to rule'
the polis, we inevitably have to ponder
over the authority and the powers that be in
holding together our society(-ies) on this
planet.
Man
wrestling with the moral authority and the
exercise of power is, with the duty of
adulthood, very well willing to stand in God's
shoes. But we are in trouble assuming that
power, problems one inevitably has to face in
politics. In the cinema was there of the
director Tom Shadyac 2003 a nice story about it
called 'Bruce
Almighty'.
It describes how a frustrated reporter who sees
everything working against him in life,
thereupon challenges God to prove that not He
Himself is the lazy, unemployed ass not doing
his duty. God then proves Himself by handing His
powers over to him, but not without the message
that he has to abide by two rules: he cannot say
he is God and he must respect the free will of
the people. And thus engaged does our hero,
hilariously drawn by Jim Carrey, end up finally
turning in again his absolute power, realizing
that the love for the goodness of the reality as
it is, is ruling the world and not so much the
special abilities with which one cannot subdue
the free, human will anyway. The combination of
the concepts of freedom and authority
constitutes a philosophical problem.
In
his book Leviathan
clarifies the philosopher Thomas
Hobbes
(1588-1679) in 1651 that to accept a certain
form of authority, whether of God or not, is
something inevitable if we do not want to end up
in a chaos of 'everyone against everyone'. So
stated next to that on a later date the
australian archeologist V.
G. Childe,
(1892-1957) in following after the dialectically
about the - in the personal and collective
history alternating - thought systems reasoning
philosopher G.
W. F. Hegel
(1770-1831), that each rule of state, implies a
dominance of hierarchy, a pecking order, a
stratification in societal classes, which he
observed as emerging from the free, gathering
and hunting man of nature who managed to
organize himself in a 'revolutionary' way from
being agricultural into having cities and thus
arriving at a division of labor. In that there
was, as seen from his marxist vision, an
evolution of the forms of state in a 'struggle
about the means' like stone, bronze and iron
with the thereto belonging eras which still
generally accepted carry those names. From
T.
Kuhn
(1922-1996) we now know that that struggle must
be considered paradigmatical and not directly
social. It is more the stir in the upper regions
than in the lower ones what is going on, even
though matters misapprehended may sometimes work
maliciously out in a downward direction. Plato
as early as in the
Republic
already from his side spoke, more refined as
Hobbes, of a hierarchy of rules of state
offering the perspective of an aristocracy of
nobles which by a timocracy directed at
(military) honor and a 'happy-few'-oligarchy of
higher officials slides down in the direction of
a tardy bureaucratic democracy of politically
belligerent representatives of a doubtful
heritage which desperate in a general call for
authority eventually corrupts into a
dictatorship of 'I am God'. Also the vedic
option offers the vision such a state of affairs
with the decay of the noble rule in the chaotic
chronic quarrel of kali-yuga, even though
they see it as something cyclic in ages covering
many thousands of eras. The sociologist
Max
Weber
(1864-1920) used a division in three in
discussing the legal authorities and this
division can be recognized as a further insight
in this process of historically sliding down or
eroding into the immoral chaotic and impersonal
uncertainty of authority. 
Departing
from the traditional authority of the
church and the nobles with respect for the
person of God, evolved according Weber the
charismatic authority of dictators like
Hitler, Napoleon, Stalin and Mao in defiance of
the holiness, which once turned over, results in
the authority of the legal-rational
authority of an institutionalized government
of which the power of rule controls itself
rather than the individual person at it's
service. And thus do we, with the historical
sense for the order of time, sociologically
arrive from personalism at formalism, the
reality of a culture of settled state officials
which so nicely was decried in e.g. the book and
the motion-picture 'A
Hitchhikers Guide to the
Galaxy'
of Douglas Adams 1979/2005. Fallen in ignorance
about the impurely lived (religious) remedies
and being fixed upon the problematic only, are
we again ripe for the psychologist, just to
notice that we this way still with all kinds of
schizoidisms are entangled in a certain
ego-determined form of being split within.
Social-psychological one may discern five forms
of exercising power in this: the power of
rewarding, the power of punishing,
the power to delegate, the power of
merit and the power of expertise.
The postmodern dissension and fallenness is then
characterized by the eroded state, which by
delegation to local authorities
rewards the ones adapted and
punishes the transgressors,
meanwhile, impersonally as she is, in her
administration is faced with a popular
compensation of charismatic celebrities
of a doubtful breed who only then really are a
threat to the establishment of the legal order,
when they have acquired a certain
expertise in relating to the popular vote
upon which, democratically, the state itself
thus also is building. With all scientific
analysis of the problem have we thus not yet
gotten out of the postmodern depression of the
modern intellect. We may, of denial with the
depression or not, see the matter as inevitably
inherent to the spoilt nature of the by
Niccolò
Machiavelli
(1469-1527) already described man of a dubious
moral fiber lusting for power, without realizing
that the ideal of an utopian state was never
lost, despite the reprehensible formulations of
utopists like Aldous
Huxley
(1894-1963) ('promiscuity is your duty' in
Brave
New World)
and B.
F. Skinner
(1904-1990) ('no individual parenting' in
Walden Two) who weren't as effective in
reasoning out the matter as did the original and
canonized utopist Thomas
More
(1478-1535) in his Utopia
('Neverland') of 1516. 
The
ideal of a god-conscious world without tyranny,
superfluous wealth, land owners, however
difficult to attain, cannot really perish
because it serves a basic psychological need and
thus, like we saw with discussing the self-ideal
in section III-a, constitutes a reality
integrally part of our existence, which also
postmodern surfaces in S.F. t.v.-series like
Startrek
e.g. Man without his dreams is as good as dead.
However unrealistic the utopia of the God Mythra
of More may seem to be, still it constitutes,
with the vedic god of time Kâla and the
thereto belonging avatâras of
Vyâsa, the indispensable aim and cultural
root where all political movements with their
programs more or less consciously depart from
and strive for. Each has, as taken from the
passion, or else from the goodness, in the
political an ideal of order and authority in
mind at the one hand, and an ideal of freedom
and happiness at the other which is not strange
to the person but rather of justice to him. But
with the relativistic splitting up of time and
place in modern time as done by the standard
time-politics of using pragmatic/economic
arguments - is no justice done to the person in
his control with the ether and his natural
functioning with brain halves that to the
contrary are fully occupied with linking space
to time. When motivated for the good one in
opposition therewith wants to do justice to that
natural order of the person, does that for that
matter not imply that one immediately agrees
about what that order exactly would be and in
which way it would have to be respected, about
how those two elements of freedom and bondage
would have to be combined in a coherent policy
acceptable to as well (natural) science as to
the spiritual (reality of the principle). Even
though Jesus said that for God the Father things
on earth had to happen as they are in heaven,
still is one not immediately of acceptance for
or known with the verse of Vyâsa in which
the respect for specifically the place and the
time is combined with the respect for the person
(S.B.
4.8: 54):
'Om namo bhagavate vâsudevâya
[my respects for Vâsudeva, the Supreme
Lord]; with this mantra [called the
dvâdas'âksara-mantra]
should the learned one exercise respect for the
physical of the Lord, the way it should be done,
with the diverse paraphernalia and as someone
conversant with the differences to place and
time
[des'a-kâla-vibhâgavit].'
As
we saw with the discussion about the fields of
action in section I-B, is there, to begin with,
no immediate agreement about how the political
field should be described. The left-right
spectrum is described by e.g. the Eysenk model,
the Nolan-distribution, the Political Compass,
de Pournelle-chart, the Inglehart-values and the
Frisian Institute (see Wikipedia:
Political
Spectrum);
the're rather structuralistic. All these models
have in common that they fail in a certain
philosophical lead of unequivocality and
clarity. That clarity though does exist ever
since Aristotle who in About the cosmos
stated: '... that this is the most admirable of
political solidarity: namely that she from the
diversity brings about a oneness and from
inequality an equality, capable of withstanding
each natural or coincidental occurrence. .....In
matters great like these teaches nature us that
equality is the guardian of solidarity and that
solidarity is the guardian of the cosmos, which
is the progenitor of each and all and of beauty
to the highest degree.' As early as in
A
Small Philosophy of
Association
we concluded accordingly that we axiomatically -
vedically thus and not singly european with
theoreticians of the democracy like Aristotle en
Alexis de Tocqeville - deriving from the dictum
'unity in diversity', were dealing with a
quantitative and qualitative dimension on the
basis of which we have the two dualities of the
quantitative individual opposed to the social,
and the qualitative concrete of matter opposed
to the abstract of having ideals, as if it
concerned two intertwined yin-yang-symbols (see
the fields-table).
Also incorporating the chinese philosophy of the
balance in nature of Lao
Tzu
(6th century B.C.) and the balance in the
reflection thereof in the culture of rule of
Confucius
(551 - 479 v. Chr.), as also the japanese shinto
philosopher Kanetomo
(1435-1511) who said that equilibrium is
divinity, must with this original clarity now,
filognostically correct of reference, and thus
being certain of our matter, the confusion of
the thought models concerning the political
order and the exercise of authority of the
modern state come to a close. It may be clear
that, reasoning from the vedic root, with the
false ego - the identification of oneself with
the material self-interest - a political
struggle has ensued of interestgroups that no
longer are fully in touch with their
statusorientation nor integer with the fields of
action the way that, more or less, with ease can
be recognized in the rational-legal authority of
state departments. The political, the official
and the lawful happen to be different options of
rule - like Charles
Montesquieu
(1689-1755) recognized it in his trias
politica of the legislative, executive and
judicial powers 0f state - even though all three
of them receive an income from the same state.
We simply have officials of discussion who with
laws engaged have to play their roles in the
chambers of discussion and there are officials
of order who simply for a state department
execute the matters of state, whatever their
personal, political preference, and we have
judges that have to watch over the human rights
in this to preclude a dictatorship of officials
or civil initiatives. The ideal consists of a
healthy common sense in relating to this
(political) reality and the problem in going for
it consists of the illusions (the
mâyâ and moha) of
people caught in the notions of the false ego
(ahankâra), in -isms, in which one
is not able to find the balance between the end
of a vision served and the means of the opulence
fundamental to it. between the vision cherished
and the quality or opulence aimed, at cannot
find the balance or the proper entry. That's
what appears to be the only clear
logical/filognostical answer to the matter. And
if we face the reality as being the holy
purpose, the holy grail of democracy, in such a
scientific way that there is as well
understanding for all the escapades of the
modernistic ego, have we neither to be afraid
for what the psychologist/philosopher
Karl
Popper
(1902-1994) warned with his plea for the open
society of a liberal democracy. 
He stated that the reality of
evolving rules of state as being a lawful one,
like e.g. is envisioned by the evolutionary
model of Marx and Hegel, doesn't mean to say
that one thus can design oneself a future that
way. According Popper is the utopia potentially
a dangerous and totalitarian vision of reality
because it implies that repeatedly the freedom
of the individual must be sacrificed for the
sake of the higher purpose, for if one leaves
man the choice in his lusty nature nothing will
become of the envisioned state. From the vedic
axiom seen must that be confirmed. It is not so
much about creating another world and pushing
oneself off against the rule of a doubtful form
of freedom by means of overturning the regime
with a violent revolution. What is of interest
is to cast off individually and thereafter also
subculturally or even collectively in the end
the shackles of the illusions upheld from the
profit mind and face the original reality, and
thus find the happiness, even though that
wouldn't directly be the happiness of each and
ultimately maybe indeed another time or world.
One cannot better the world turning oneself away
from it either socialistic or individualistic,
or pushing oneself off against it; one has to
see it as it is and then, with bettering one's
own life also as an example and support for
others being of service with it, be happier with
that in the sense of finding a life better in
agreement with one's own nature. And so it is
like not just Vyâsa put it with his
concepts of svadharma and
svarûpa (one's own nature and
form), but also like the philosopher Seneca
in his selfrealization stated it in 'A Happy
Life' III.3 later on in history talking about
that better life. Like Popper indicated it with
his idea of the 'piecemeal engineering'
of a gradual realization of politically set
targets, is also with Vyâsa already that
idea found in his per paramparâ, or
disciplic succession, passing on of the
spiritual authority, which thus allows for but a
step by step (B.G.
6: 25)
cultural evolution in which the individual first
of all is faced with a 'bitter' hangover from
the lesson learnt and only later on may harvest
the 'sweet' of a better practice (B.G.
18:
36-38)
- a practice of a filognostical, personally
conveyed, virtuous way and proper life-habit of
gratitude and servitude equal to the
moksha of individual liberation or else
the individual/subcultural attaining on this
planet of vaikunthha, the vedic heaven of
that order of life in which there is no
(vai-) dullness and sloth
(-kunthha) any more and one therefor has
nothing to fear.
The fake-democracy must, as we
before saw in the Small
Philosophy of
Association,
be remedied with a self-certain sense of order,
with a certain settled, representative democracy
in which the concept of freedom is not as much
bound to chaos as to order any longer; thus was
also confirmed e.g. in 2003 by the muslim-writer
and journalist Fareed
Zakaria
in his book the Future of Freedom.
Filognostically does that gradual 'soft'
revolution, that turning around of the societal
opinion and evolving of democracy, not look much
different from what e.g. Seneca likewise in e.g.
his dialogues (III.3) already out of love for
the ethereal integrity concluded: 'wisdom
is: not to stray away from her (viz. nature) and
conform oneself to her law and the example she
offers.
Thus it was at
the violent onset of the French
Revolution
in which a clock-maker lead the storming of the
Bastille in 1789 when, be it unsuccessful, a
decimal system was introduced with the
revolutionary clock and calendar with the
purpose to restore the natural authority of
nature over man. And thus will it also ever be,
like Seneca it said, in the renewed, less
violent efforts to make that revolution of time
still a success. It is, with the soft revolution
of gradualness, more the observance of
inevitable facts and trends and the prominence
of natural and social realities that cannot be
denied or compensated away what determines the
future. Even so concerns it first of all the
highly personal, selfrealized future of an
individual, emancipating person who gradually,
as well being a beacon for others, thus learns
to live closer to the happiness of the natural
God. Therewith will there in the political era -
which vedically rules ever since the battle of
the great war of the Mahâbhârata
and as said is called kali-yuga - be
an ongoing discussion between the doubters and
skeptics who, on the basis of their own betrayal
of the regulative principles of the game of
order, have to face the karma thereof. For
without the philosophy miss they what Seneca in
The Way to Wisdom called her most
important achievement: gratitude and the correct
way to express it.
The duty of loving one's fellow man
consists of keeping open the door to that
Vaikunthha, to that utopia and to clear the path
leading there, and not so much to impose that by
means of the law. To speak with Niccolò
Machiavelli
(1469-1529) and
his book The Prince 
is
it not proper or of political leadership to have
in mind anything else but the practical use,
eventually even in defiance of the ethical code,
of the maintenance of the, till then evolved,
status quo to which one consequently mustn't try
to improve the citizen or tempt him into further
corruption. The moral finger is reserved for the
intellect and not so much for the ruler taking
advise from him. The utilitarian, at the
practical use directed, idea of the power of
state consists of making the best of the state
with the way people happen to be and not so much
in the effort to teach them enlightenment and
educate them for the sake of another world, even
though one at the other hand cannot object to
that as a manifestation of 'free enterprise' and
'free organization'. Each has to follow his own
dictate, only then will we be free from
dictatorship. Only then is there understanding
for the fact that the jailhouse of standard time
that keeps all, politically opposing,
materialists imprisoned in a relativistic denial
of the ether, cannot be broken down just like
that, the way one wouldn't either with any other
jailhouse. Only then are we able to understand
F. Nietzsche as being of goodness with his plea
for the selfrealization of the individual. With
the game of order as we explained it in the
previous section, is not so much the human being
educated, as, rather, respected in as well his
fallen state as in his elevated state, by
relativizing the concepts of being higher and
lower, abstract and concrete and the being
directed upward and downward so as to have them
as free and equal options open to a personal
evolution. The blessing of God is there with the
faculty of right discrimination. Only with such
a respect for the fullness of life of as well
the common man who living a concrete and
material life can be saintly, as for the man of
education who very abstract and high of
commitment, with or without much experience, can
be just as saintly in his selfrespect and
respect for the (filognostic) person of God, may
one speak of a truly successful policy. It is,
being unafraid about utopian thoughts of the
future, as Seneca it also said in A Happy
Life (V): 'Thus one force will come about,
one harmonious potency, and thus will a reason
that is dependable find it's existence which is
not divided in itself and is not caught in
ideas, concepts or a conviction. And when this
has spread itself throughout the complete and is
connected with her parts and, if I may use the
figure of speech, when everything sings the same
song, has she attained the highest good. For
nothing low awaits her anymore, no lubricity,
nothing from which she would reel or slip.' And
vedically again we have to add to it that the
utopia is there always for those individuals
successful in living up to that filognostic
notion of order of the visions relating to the
order of nature, but is never there
realistically - and possibly even constitutes a
threat - for the ones who not as conversant with
it do not cherish such a lucid mind about the
ultimate filognostical reality the way it, as is
proven by the oldest vedical scriptures and also
the later greek and roman scriptures, as such
existed always, there now is and there also as a
bright and radiant future will be. With the
filognostic revolutions, at present taking place
on the basis of the love for the knowledge in
the different societal realms as discussed here,
goes the saying politically: stand up for your
rights, and stop fighting each other; do not
fight each other with illusions, rather fight
illusions with each other. For Homo sapiens, the
knowing man, is the name.
Originally
was the time, from a societal perspective, a
religious concept and differed politicians
little from priests in e.g. ancient Rome. Plato
and Socrates had said that the ultimate
settlement of the order of things was to the god
Apollo, with which they indicated that the time
and the ether, and the concept of societal order
associated with it, essentially is a matter of
religiosity, something which in science nowadays
is known as the apollonian principle with which
it as well factually, with them as the
philosophical founding fathers of that idea,
consciously commits itself to the divine. Plato
with it put forward, in 'The
Republic'
the political values of wisdom, courage,
moderation and justice, but what did we have as
a precursor of values before them and what
evolved therefrom? The
Filognostic
Manifesto
this section opens with, begins with an
historical overview of the human values which
clarifies the (r)evolution of the knowledge in
and about time. Ultimately will we, if we thus
with our filognosy in the thereafter following
pages take a sober look into the future, have a
world order which, having arrived at
galactocentric
consciousness,
is based upon a
systematical
and programmed
respect for the human rights and one's civil
identity; in which the cultures of
the solar and lunar
calendars
both will be reflected; in which
the
year count is no longer linked
exclusively
to this or that religious preference; in which
in
a non-repressive dualism of
governance
there won't be a single ruling and commanding
time-system, but rather an attitude more
naturally conscious of social relativizing and
multicultural solidarity based upon freedom of
choice; in which political
parties
no longer will struggle for being
elected
but rather the people, all together more
structurally aware of each others -isms, in
stead of defying each other, will fight to
overcome the illusions of false unification and
unemployment they have in denial of the
diversity; and will the (post-)modern disease of
estranged materialistic cynicism and anarchistic
relativism be overcome to
the benefit of the
splendor
and the ethereal of a more realistical,
rational, identity-conscious and personally
bound, representative world democracy which with
the option of a better balanced, good and
natural order of time will be of
recollection
with her (also digital) citizens, offering each
a life that, in the harmony of the filognostic
self control with the forcefield of the ether,
is free from fear and confusion.
Footnote:
*:
Entropy: based on the natural propensity for
disorder of all material systems.
Pictures:
-
The first untitled painting of an
unfinished structure is of Keith
Haring
(site),
1989, acryl on canvas, 39 1/2 x 39 1/2, and is
© of the Keith Haring estate.
-
The picture of a seashell represents a
conch or conchshell. It is used as a
signal horn in vedic sacrifices and represents
one of the standard attributes of Lord Vishnu by
means of which He summons for the
fight.
-
The nineteenth century young man is a picture of
Alexis de Tocqueville, it is a
photograph of an etching of the 1899 edition of
"Democracy In America".
-
The man with the mustache is Friedrich
Nietzsche (painter unknown) the way he
is also seen on many a photograph.
-
The picture of the man with the folded hands is
of Johannes Moreelse (1602-1634) and titled:
Herakleitos.
-
Redon, Odilon: the Cactus Man
1881, charcoal, 49 x 32.5 cm, The Woodner Family
Collection, New York.
-
Holbein d. J., Hans 1497/98 1543: Portrait
of Desiderius Erasmus.
-
The picture of 'the king of the world' is an
etching from the book Leviathan of
Thomas More.
-
The picture of the serious man is a photograph
of Max Weber
(1864-1920).
-
The Island of Utopia, 1518, woodcut,
17,8 x 11,8 cm. Öffentliche Kunstsammlung,
Basel.
-
The friendly looking man following after the
yin-yang-symbol is a picture of the
philosopher/psychologist Sir Karl
Popper.
-
The painting with the castle is of Jean-Pierre
Louis Laurent Houel (1735-1813), and is titled
Storming of the Bastille. At home
in the Bibliothèque Nationale
Française. Catalogue number 07743702;
water colors; 37,8 x 50,5 cm. Published 1789. In
the middle one can see how Bernard René
Jourdan, marquis de Launay is arrested
(1740-1789).
-
Ridolfo del Ghirlandaio (Ridolfo Bigordi detto,
Firenze, 1483 - 1561) Portrait of
Niccolò Macchiavelli, Oil on
panel, cm. 85 x 67. London, private
collection.
The
site linear as a perfection of the causal
illusion:
